POL 5032 WEEK II

Some 70 years and more than a quarter century have passed since the Potsdam Conference and the fall of the Berlin Wall.  Now the world is facing three serious issues: ISIS in the Middle East and North Africa; fallout over Greek debt; and the threat of Russian dominance of eastern Ukraine and perhaps other parts of Eastern Europe.  All were key areas of confrontation at or just after the Potsdam Conference.  Of the three, Putin’s revival of a new confrontation appears to be the most imminent and dangerous threat, and I am reminded by his actions of the complete and senseless failure of European democratic governments to support the Spanish Government against General Franco’s Fascist incursion into Spain.  France and the UK’s nonsensical attitude not to support Spain during the Spanish Civil War led to its collapse. Once again, watching Angela Merkel and François Hollande at their most recent press conference, I fear that their failure to support the Ukraine’s military forces with military equipment is another problematic déjà vu. And has the hegemon gone ‘walkabout’, to pay homage to an Australian term?

As much as I would like to pursue the topics raised above, our mission this week is to explore and unpack the notion of Hegemonic Stability Theory, Regimes, Ruggie’s ‘Embedded Liberalism', the nexus between domestic and international politics through international bargaining and Gilpin’s core theories of IPE.   

Much has been written about Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST). One point I wish to stress here is that the international system is more likely to remain stable when a single nation, or hegemon dominates the rules and arrangements of the international system.  If we return to Charles KIndleberger, who argued that a lack of world leadership led to the Great Depression between the wars, then we can assume that the rise of the United States after WW II and its control of the Bretton Woods system created the environment for the enormous strides in growth and prosperity after the war. 

Moreover, while the classical liberal interpretation of HST argues that the hegemon, using institutions, will cover the commons through ‘enlightened self-interest’, Stephen Krasner has made it quite clear that this self-interest will take the form of an international regime, ‘defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations’.  Changes in principles and norms result in changes to the regime itself.  For example, John Ruggie contends that ‘the distinction between orthodox and embedded liberalism involves differences over norms and principles.  Orthodox liberalism endorses increasing the scope of the market.  Embedded liberalism prescribes state action to contain domestic social and economic dislocations generated by markets’.  Thus orthodox and embedded liberalism define different regimes.

The interaction between domestic and international politics is self-evident when we contrast and compare classical liberalism and embedded liberalism.  We are indebted to Robert Putnam and Frederick Meyer for a mid-range theory known as ‘Two-Level Games’.  Using international bargaining to differentiate between domestic and international game boards, Putnam and Meyer have demonstrated how domestic politics can influence a state’s stance within the international system.  This position stands in stark contrast to Waltz’s Realism, which looks to the structure of the international system and indeed the state acting as a rational actor to understand its position within the international system.  Realism underpins IPE’s core theory of Mercantilism, which stands in contrast to Gilpin’s notions of liberalism and Marxist structural theories.

If I may return briefly to Putin.  What drives him at the moment to defy the West and suffer the indignity of sanctions and a falling Rouble?  Is it really in Russia’s national interest to acquire more territory or control over more territory, or is Putin playing to a set of domestic factions, and in particular the military, to enhance his power and maintain control of Russia?  Can we explain, as an alternative, Putin’s actions in terms of IPE theory?